Fifteen Years Apart: Supreme Court Dissolves Marriage Under Article 142, Upholds Cruelty Finding
A bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih dissolves a doctor-couple's marriage after 15 years of separation, holding prolonged estrangement itself constitutes cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act.
The Supreme Court on 2 June 2026 dismissed the appeal of a wife challenging the Rajasthan High Court's grant of divorce to her husband, and went further to dissolve the marriage independently under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India. The bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih held that persistent denial of conjugal rights during the brief period of cohabitation amounted to mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and that over 15 years of unbroken separation had rendered the marriage emotionally dead and beyond salvage. The judgment clarifies that an appellate court may treat prolonged post-filing separation as confirmatory evidence of cruelty without invoking Article 142, and that Article 142 remains available as a parallel, independent route to dissolution where the marriage has broken down irretrievably.
How the Dispute Reached the Supreme Court
Sonal Talpada and Veerbhan Singh, both doctors in government service, married on 5 December 2007 in Nadiyad Khera, Gujarat, according to Hindu rites. No child was born from the marriage. At the time of the wedding, the wife was working as a gynaecologist at a government hospital in Gujarat while the husband was in State service in Rajasthan.
The couple cohabited for barely two to three months at their matrimonial home in Bharatpur, Rajasthan. Sociocultural differences surfaced quickly. The husband filed a divorce petition in 2009 before the Family Court at Bharatpur under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, alleging cruelty.
The Family Court dismissed the petition on 21 August 2019, finding that the husband had failed to prove cruelty. The husband appealed. The Rajasthan High Court, by its judgment dated 2 January 2025, allowed the appeal and granted a decree of divorce. The wife then approached the Supreme Court by way of a special leave petition, which was converted into a civil appeal after leave was granted.
At the admission stage, the Supreme Court referred the parties to mediation by order dated 23 May 2025. The mediation report dated 27 November 2025 recorded that mediation was unsuccessful. No further reconciliation efforts were made by either party.
The Wife's Case and the Husband's Response
The wife's counsel argued that she had never abandoned the husband and remained willing to continue matrimonial life. She contended that it was the husband who had deserted her, and that he could not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. Counsel pointed out that the grounds of desertion and irretrievable breakdown had not been pleaded in the original divorce petition. The wife had, counsel submitted, left her government job in Gujarat and moved to Bharatpur to save the marriage. The father of the husband had, during cross-examination, admitted that he had told the wife's father she could continue working in Gujarat until a nursing home was constructed in Bharatpur — a construction that never commenced.
The husband's counsel countered that the wife had made no genuine effort to save the marriage. The parties had cohabited for only two to three months across 18 years. The wife had repeatedly denied sexual relations. There was no mutual trust, companionship, or shared experience. Counsel urged dissolution on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, relying on Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, Vikas Kanaujia v. Sarita, Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, and other decisions.
What the Court Held on Cruelty
The Court examined the four grounds on which the High Court had granted divorce: the wife's alleged insult of the husband before a shopkeeper near the Taj Mahal; denial of sexual relations on several occasions; desertion through long absence from the matrimonial home; and 15 years of separation.
On the Taj Mahal incident, the Court agreed with the Family Court's assessment. The husband had himself admitted the monument was closed that day, so there was no need to hire a guide. The wife asking for a teddy bear was not cruelty.
On the question of sexual relations, the Court found the evidence significant. During the short period of cohabitation, the wife would sleep early, lock her room from inside, and not open the door when the husband knocked. The husband slept in a separate room. The wife did not deny that they slept in different rooms. Drawing on Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, the Court held that a unilateral decision to refuse intercourse for a considerable period without physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty. The High Court's acceptance of cruelty on this ground was sustained.
The Court then addressed the broader conduct of the parties. It held that matrimony is not a one-sided right to be enforced but a shared covenant where rights are tied to duties. Conjugal rights do not exist in a vacuum; they are the structural counterparts to conjugal duties. Persistent withdrawal from the foundational aspects of marriage carries legal consequences when evaluating mental cruelty.
On the question of desertion, the Court noted that the father-in-law's permission for the wife to work in Gujarat until a nursing home was built did not amount to a licence to indefinitely avoid matrimonial obligations. When the nursing home construction did not proceed, neither party took steps to restore cohabitation.
Prolonged Separation as Cruelty: The Appellate Court's Latitude
The Court addressed a significant procedural and substantive question: can an appellate court take into account events occurring after the filing of the divorce petition, including the continuation of separation during litigation?
The answer was yes. The Court held that an appeal is a continuation of a suit, and an appellate court is entitled to consider the conduct of parties during the pendency of litigation. Once the initial statutory mandate for a ground such as desertion is satisfied, its continuation during litigation aggravates the agony and can be taken into account to confirm the pleaded ground.
The Court further held that an appellate court may treat prolonged separation — coupled with absence of genuine reconciliation efforts, complete cessation of cohabitation, and emotional alienation — as evidence of mental cruelty within Section 13(1)(ia). This, the Court said, is not an invocation of extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 142 but a lawful application of the statutory cruelty ground to the facts.
The Court also observed that where both spouses choose independent professional and geographical paths and remain completely estranged without any reciprocal effort to bridge the distance, desertion ceases to be a matter of individual fault. It assumes the character of a shared, de facto abandonment of the matrimonial covenant by both sides.
Article 142: Irretrievable Breakdown as an Independent Ground
Having upheld the divorce decree on the cruelty ground, the Court went on to independently dissolve the marriage under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India on the ground of irretrievable breakdown.
The Court applied the framework laid down by the Constitution Bench in Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, which requires the Court to be fully convinced that the marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead, and beyond salvation. Relevant factors include the period of cohabitation, the last date of cohabitation, the nature of allegations, the outcome of mediation attempts, and the economic and social circumstances of the parties.
On the facts: the parties had been living separately for over 15 years; they had cohabited for only two to three months across the entire marriage; mediation had failed; no child had been born; and both parties were financially independent doctors in government service. The wife continued to work in Gujarat despite claiming she had left her job there — no evidence supported the claim that she had relocated to Bharatpur.
The Court quoted from Shilpa Sailesh that “grant of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage by this Court is not a matter of right, but a discretion which is to be exercised with great care and caution.” It also drew on Vikas Kanaujia v. Sarita, where dissolution was granted after 22 years of separation and only 43 days of cohabitation, and on R. Srinivas Kumar v. R. Shametha, where Article 142 was exercised after 22 years of separation.
The Court noted that the wife's stated willingness to continue the marriage was not matched by her actions. She continued to reside and work in Gujarat. The Court observed that “actions speak more than the dry words.” Dissolution would not harm any third party, as there were no children.
On the broader policy dimension, the Court held that prolonged pendency of matrimonial litigation perpetuates a marriage only on paper. Prolongation of a dead relationship leads to escalating frustration and denies both parties the freedom to rebuild their lives.
Outcome
The Supreme Court dismissed the wife's appeal. The High Court's decree of divorce in favour of the husband was upheld on the ground of mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Court additionally dissolved the marriage in exercise of its powers under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. No order as to costs was made. All pending applications were disposed of.