Fifteen Years Apart: Supreme Court Upholds Divorce, Finds Prolonged Separation Itself Constitutes Cruelty
A bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih dismisses a wife's appeal, holding that fifteen years of separation and denial of conjugal rights amount to mental cruelty under the Hindu Marriage Act.
The Supreme Court on 2 June 2026 dismissed the appeal of a Rajasthan wife who had contested her husband's divorce petition for over fifteen years, upholding the High Court of Rajasthan's decree dissolving the marriage. The bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih found that persistent denial of conjugal rights during the brief period of cohabitation, combined with an unbroken separation of more than fifteen years and failed mediation, constituted mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Court also invoked Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India to dissolve the marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, holding that continuation of a formal legal tie in such circumstances would itself perpetuate cruelty on both parties.
How the Dispute Reached the Supreme Court
The parties married on 5 December 2007 in Nadiyad Khera, Gujarat, under Hindu rites. At the time, the wife was a gynaecologist in a government hospital in Gujarat and the husband was a doctor in State service in Rajasthan. No child was born from the marriage.
The couple cohabited for only two to three months at their matrimonial home in Bharatpur, Rajasthan. The husband filed a divorce petition in 2009 before the Family Court at Bharatpur under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, alleging cruelty. The Family Court dismissed the petition on 21 August 2019, holding that the husband had failed to prove cruelty committed by the wife.
The husband appealed. The High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur, by its judgment dated 2 January 2025, allowed the appeal and set aside the Family Court's decree, granting divorce. The wife then approached the Supreme Court by way of a special leave petition, which was converted into the present civil appeal.
At the admission stage, the Supreme Court referred the parties to mediation on 23 May 2025. The mediation report dated 27 November 2025 recorded that mediation was unsuccessful. No further reconciliation efforts were made by either party.
The Wife's Case and the Husband's Response
Counsel for the wife argued that she had never abandoned the husband and was always willing to lead a matrimonial life with him. She contended that the husband had not allowed her to perform her conjugal duties and that it was he who had deserted her. The grounds of desertion and irretrievable breakdown had not been pleaded in the divorce petition, she submitted, and the husband could not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong.
On the question of her continued employment in Gujarat, the wife's counsel submitted that the husband's father had himself permitted her to work in Nadiyad Khera until a nursing home was constructed in Bharatpur. Since construction never commenced, she continued working in Gujarat. The husband, it was argued, had produced no evidence of cruelty.
Counsel for the husband countered that the wife had made no genuine effort to save the marriage. The parties had cohabited for merely two to three months across eighteen years of marriage. The wife had denied sexual relations on several occasions. There was no chance of reconciliation, and the marriage had broken down irretrievably. He urged the Court to dissolve the marriage on that ground.
What the Court Held on Cruelty
The Court examined the High Court's four grounds for granting divorce: an alleged insult before a shopkeeper during a visit to the Taj Mahal; denial of sexual relations on several occasions; desertion through long absence from the matrimonial home; and fifteen years of separation.
On the Taj Mahal incident, the Court agreed with the Family Court that the husband had himself admitted the monument was closed that day, making the hiring of a guide unnecessary. There was nothing wrong in the wife asking for a teddy bear. This ground was rejected.
On the question of denial of conjugal rights, the Court found that even during the short period of cohabitation, the wife used to sleep early, lock her room from inside, and never open the door when the husband knocked. The husband slept in a separate room. The wife did not deny that they slept in different rooms. The Court held that this acceptance of the cruelty ground by the High Court was correct.
Relying on Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, the Court reiterated that a unilateral decision to refuse intercourse for a considerable period without physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty. Persistent refusal of sexual intercourse without reasonable cause constitutes mental cruelty and is a valid ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the HMA. The High Court's conclusion was sustained and the divorce decree upheld on this ground.
Desertion, Conduct During Litigation, and the Appellate Court's Latitude
The Court acknowledged that the statutory ground of desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) of the HMA had not been formally pleaded. However, it held that matrimonial disputes are seldom confined to isolated legal labels. Courts are required to examine the overall conduct of the parties and the manner in which they have discharged their matrimonial obligations.
On the nursing home arrangement, the Court found that the father-in-law's permission for the wife to work in Gujarat until a nursing home was built did not amount to a licence to avoid matrimonial obligations indefinitely. When the nursing home construction did not progress, both parties were required to take steps to cohabit. No such effort was made by either side.
The Court laid down a significant proposition regarding appellate jurisdiction: where desertion has been pleaded and the initial statutory period is satisfied, continuation of that desertion during litigation aggravates the agony and can be taken into consideration by an appellate court. An appeal is the continuation of a suit, and the appellate court is entitled to consider the conduct of parties during the pendency of litigation to support or reject a ground for divorce.
The Court further held that an appellate court may legitimately treat a prolonged period of separation as an indicator of mental cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(ia) of the HMA, provided it ensures that a party does not profit from their own manifest wrong or unilateral desertion. Subsequent events occurring during the pendency of proceedings may legitimately be taken into consideration. In such circumstances, the Court held, confirmation of a divorce decree by an appellate court is not an invocation of extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 142, but a lawful application of the statutory ground of cruelty to the facts.
Irretrievable Breakdown and Article 142
The Court also addressed the ground of irretrievable breakdown. It found that the parties had been living separately for more than fifteen years, had cohabited for only two to three months, and that all efforts at reconciliation — including court-referred mediation — had failed. There was no possibility of reunion.
Drawing on the Constitution Bench judgment in Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, the Court recalled that dissolution of marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown under Article 142(1) is not a matter of right but a discretion to be exercised with great care, only when the Court is fully convinced that the marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead, and beyond salvation. The Constitution Bench had also clarified that the judgments in Darshan Gupta v. Radhika Gupta and Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Manju Sharma — relied upon by the wife — do not foreclose this discretion.
The Court noted that both parties are doctors in government service — the wife in Gujarat and the husband in Rajasthan — and are financially independent. There are no children from the marriage. Grant of divorce would not have a devastating effect on any third party.
On the wife's claim that she had left her government job in Gujarat and moved to Bharatpur to save the marriage, the Court found no evidence on record to substantiate this. The evidence was to the contrary: she continued with her job in Gujarat. The Court observed that “actions speak more than the dry words.”
Referring to Vikas Kanaujia v. Sarita and R. Srinivas Kumar v. R. Shametha, the Court noted that it had exercised Article 142 powers in comparable situations involving separations of over twenty-two years and twenty-two years respectively. In the present case, the separation of over fifteen years, the absence of any genuine reconciliation effort, and the complete cessation of marital interaction led the Court to conclude that the marriage had broken down irretrievably.
The Court also observed that prolonged pendency of matrimonial litigation perpetuates a marriage only on paper, and that it is in the best interest of the parties and society to sever ties where litigation has been pending for a considerably long period. It described continuation of such a relationship as leading to “foul sociological, psychological and mental hollowness in life.”
Order
The Supreme Court dismissed the civil appeal filed by the wife. The marriage between Sonal Talpada and Veerbhan Singh stands dissolved in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. There is no order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.