Proof of Demand Is Indispensable in Bribery Cases; Mere Recovery Cannot Sustain Conviction
A Supreme Court bench of Justices Pankaj Mithal and Prasanna B. Varale dismisses Uttar Pradesh's appeal, holding that absent proof of demand, no conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act can stand.
The Supreme Court has dismissed the State of Uttar Pradesh's challenge to the acquittal of three Central Excise officers accused of demanding and accepting a bribe of Rs. 80,000 in 1995. The Court found that the prosecution had failed to establish the foundational requirement of demand beyond reasonable doubt, that material witnesses had turned hostile, and that the investigating agency had withheld a tape-recorded conversation that could have conclusively identified who was present at the alleged meeting. With the presumption of innocence reinforced by the High Court's acquittal, the bench found no ground to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution.
How the Case Reached the Supreme Court
The dispute traces back to 5 January 1995, when R.K. Srivastava, Superintendent, Central Excise, along with Inspectors A.K. Gaba and Alok Gupta, visited M/s Prime Products, Kursi Road, Barabanki, and inspected the adjoining factory M/s Amoli Ceraplast Ltd. The officers seized all available records of M/s Amoli Ceraplast Ltd. without issuing any acknowledgement.
On 10 January 1995, at around 10.00 p.m., complainant Kuldeep Tiwari, a Retainer Consultant, visited R.K. Srivastava's office and asked for the documents to be returned. Srivastava allegedly told him that the documents would not be returned unless he paid Rs. 80,000 as illegal gratification. Tiwari lodged an FIR with the Superintendent of Police, CBI, Lucknow.
Later that same evening, Tiwari and a shadow witness returned to Srivastava's office, where A.K. Gaba and Alok Gupta were also said to be present. On 14 January 1995, Tiwari visited Srivastava's residence with Rs. 80,000. A CBI team raided the house and recovered Rs. 60,000 from the bedroom and Rs. 20,000 from the pocket of P.K. Srivastava's jacket. The hands of R.K. Srivastava, P.K. Srivastava, and one Dushyant Kumar tested positive in the phenolphthalein solution.
A charge-sheet was filed on 11 November 1997 for offences under Section 120-B IPC read with Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Sections 114 and 201 IPC read with Section 7 and Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Criminal Case No. 05/1997 was registered before the Special Judge, Lucknow.
The Special Judge convicted R.K. Srivastava, A.K. Gaba, Dushyant Kumar, and Alok Gupta by order dated 26 July 2014 under Section 120-B IPC read with Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act, while acquitting P.K. Srivastava on benefit of doubt. The three convicted Inspectors appealed to the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench. By order dated 27 May 2019, the High Court allowed all three criminal appeals and acquitted the respondents. The State of Uttar Pradesh then approached the Supreme Court.
The State's Case and the Respondents' Answer
The State argued that the High Court had not correctly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence. It contended that A.K. Gaba and Alok Gupta were present on 10 January 1995 when the initial demand was made, and also on 7 January 1995 when records were seized without a seizure receipt. Dushyant Kumar, it was submitted, was present on 14 January 1995 when the bribe was accepted and had counted the money after its acceptance. The State further argued that since the respondents were charged under Section 120-B IPC read with Sections 7 and 13(2) of the PC Act — and not under those sections as substantive offences — there was no legal requirement to independently prove the ingredients of demand and acceptance against each of them.
The respondents countered that the conviction rested on bare presumption of presence. They pointed out that the respondents were subordinate officers who were required by protocol to accompany their senior. They drew attention to the fact that accused no. 5 (P.K. Srivastava), from whose pocket Rs. 20,000 was recovered, had been acquitted by the Trial Court itself, placing the respondents on a better footing since no recovery was made from them and no evidence showed that the records were seized at their instance.
On the conspiracy charge, the respondents raised a structural flaw: while all three Inspectors were charged under Section 120-B IPC, the principal accused R.K. Srivastava — the alleged chief conspirator — was not charged under Section 120-B at all. This, they argued, severed any legal link between the respondents and the primary act of demand and acceptance.
What the Court Held on Demand and Acceptance
The Court found considerable merit in the respondents' submissions. It held that the High Court had thoroughly re-appreciated the evidence in proper perspective and was justified in finding that the prosecution had miserably failed to establish its case.
The Court reaffirmed the settled position that proof of demand of illegal gratification is the sine qua non for conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Mere recovery of tainted money, divorced from proof of demand and voluntary acceptance, cannot by itself sustain a conviction. The Court drew on a line of its earlier decisions — B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh, Krishan Chander v. State of Delhi, Rakesh Kapoor v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Banarsi Dass v. State of Haryana, and C.M. Sharma v. State of Andhra Pradesh — all of which consistently hold that recovery alone is insufficient.
The Court quoted from P. Satyanarayana Murthy: “failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal.” It applied this directly to the facts, noting that the prosecution evidence regarding demand was doubtful and unreliable, particularly because the complainant and several material witnesses had not supported the prosecution version in material particulars. As a consequence, the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act could not be invoked against the respondents.
The Conspiracy Charge and the Missing Tape Recording
On the charge under Section 120-B IPC, the Court found that the prosecution had equally failed. It reiterated that to establish criminal conspiracy, there must be satisfactory evidence of a meeting of minds between the accused to hatch and execute the conspiracy. Mere presence at a location, or association with the principal accused, is not enough. The Court referred to State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu and Esher Singh v. State of A.P. for the proposition that each incriminating circumstance must be clearly established by reliable evidence forming an irresistible chain, and that suspicion cannot take the place of legal proof.
The Court found that, apart from alleging the respondents' presence at certain places during the relevant period, the prosecution had produced no substantive evidence of any prior agreement or concert between the respondents and R.K. Srivastava. The principal allegation of demand was against Srivastava alone, and no independent material showed that the respondents actively participated in the demand or shared the criminal intent necessary for conspiracy. The structural anomaly — that the alleged chief conspirator was not himself charged under Section 120-B — further undermined the prosecution's theory.
A separate and significant finding concerned the tape recorder. The complainant had stated in his testimony that he carried a tape recorder to record the conversation on the evening of 10 January 1995. The investigating agency never seized this recording, and no explanation was offered for its absence. The High Court had found that the tape recorder was concealed by the prosecution to falsely implicate A.K. Gaba and Alok Gupta, and that the Trial Court had ignored this concealment of vital evidence.
The Supreme Court agreed. Relying on Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, it held that an adverse inference under Section 114 Illustration (g) of the Evidence Act may be drawn against the prosecution where material evidence in its possession is withheld without justification. The failure to produce the tape-recorded conversation was particularly significant because it could have conclusively established who was present at the alleged demand meeting and what was actually said.
Scope of Interference Against Acquittal
The Court addressed the standard governing its own jurisdiction. Citing Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, it recalled that where an accused has been acquitted, a double presumption of innocence operates — first, the general presumption of innocence in criminal jurisprudence, and second, the reinforcement of that presumption by the acquittal itself. Where two reasonable conclusions are possible on the evidence, the appellate court should not disturb the acquittal.
The Court also referred to State of Rajasthan v. Abdul Mannan and Hakeem Khan v. State of M.P. for the principle that the view taken by the High Court need only be a plausible and possible view arising from the evidence; it need not be the only view. The Court found that the High Court had meticulously re-appreciated the entire evidence and assigned cogent reasons for extending benefit of doubt. The findings were neither perverse nor contrary to law.
Exercising jurisdiction under Article 136, the Court held that interference is unwarranted unless findings are manifestly illegal, perverse, or result in a miscarriage of justice. No such exceptional circumstance was made out.
Order
The Supreme Court dismissed Criminal Appeal Nos. 3383–3385 of 2025 as devoid of merit. The acquittal of the respondents recorded by the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, by order dated 27 May 2019 was upheld. Pending applications, if any, were disposed of.