Allahabad HC Dismisses FIR Mandamus Writ Filed Without First Approaching Magistrate Under BNSS Section 175(3)

The Allahabad High Court dismissed a writ seeking FIR registration against Jagadguru Rambhadracharya, holding that Section 175(3) BNSS must be exhausted before invoking Article 226.

A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, comprising Justice Chandra Dhari Singh and Justice Tarun Saxena, dismissed a criminal misc. writ petition filed by Ramesh Upadhyay, an advocate practising at Varanasi, who sought a mandamus directing police to register an FIR against Jagadguru Rambhadracharya. The bench held that the petitioner had bypassed the structured statutory remedy available under Section 175(3) of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”), and could not invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India without first exhausting that remedy. The dismissal reflects the court's concern about a growing pattern of litigants approaching the High Court at the first instance in FIR-related grievances.

The Complaint and the FIR That Was Never Registered

According to the petitioner, on 1 October 2025 at approximately 3.30 PM, while he was present in Chamber No. 46 of the Advocate Building, Collectorate, Varanasi, certain persons showed him a video containing statements made by respondent no. 4 — identified in the record as Jagadguru Rambhadracharya — which the petitioner alleged were directed against members of a particular community. He submitted that the statements caused grave mental agony, humiliation, and insult, and that the videos were publicly circulated on social media platforms including YouTube. It was also alleged that respondent no. 4 had made objectionable remarks against revered religious personalities including Shankaracharyas, thereby hurting the religious sentiments of several followers.

On 8 October 2025, the petitioner wrote to the Commissioner of Police, Varanasi, requesting registration of an FIR under appropriate penal provisions. A copy of that letter was also addressed to the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh and the Union Home Minister. The petitioner appended this letter as Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition.

When no FIR was registered despite his complaint, the petitioner filed Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 20106 of 2026 before the High Court, seeking a writ in the nature of mandamus compelling the respondent authorities to register an FIR and to ensure fair investigation.

The State's Objections

The Additional Government Advocate, Mr. S.K. Ojha, opposed the petition on several grounds. The State raised a specific objection that the letter dated 8 October 2025 was never received by any police official and had not been authenticated through postal or police records. The bench, upon examining the writ petition and its annexures, found that the petitioner had furnished no proof of receipt or postal tracking.

The State also pointed out that the petitioner had never approached the concerned Station House Officer directly for registration of the FIR. Critically, the AGA submitted that where a person has a grievance about non-registration of an FIR, the prescribed statutory remedy is not to approach the High Court under Article 226, but to approach the concerned Magistrate under Section 175(3) BNSS. The writ petition, the State argued, was filed without following this statutory sequence and amounted to a misuse of the process of law.

The Bench's Reasoning on Alternate Remedy

The bench framed the central issue as whether a writ petition seeking registration of an FIR is maintainable when the petitioner has not availed the remedy under Section 175(3) BNSS, 2023.

The court reiterated the well-established position that while the power under Article 226 extends beyond enforcement of fundamental rights and the High Court retains discretion to entertain a writ, that discretion is subject to self-imposed restrictions — including the rule that efficacious alternate remedies must be exhausted first. Exceptions exist only in limited categories: enforcement of a fundamental right under Part III, violation of principles of natural justice, proceedings wholly without jurisdiction, or challenge to the vires of a legislation. The bench found none of those exceptional circumstances present in this case.

The bench relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2008) 2 SCC 409, which held categorically that when a person's grievance is that an FIR has not been registered, the remedy lies before the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC — now Section 175(3) BNSS — and not before the High Court under Article 226. Under that provision, the Magistrate, on being prima facie satisfied, may direct registration of the FIR, order a proper investigation, recommend a change of investigating officer, and even monitor the investigation. The court characterised this remedy as not merely an alternative but as the primary and preferred remedy that must be exhausted before approaching the High Court.

The bench also cited the Supreme Court's recent decision in Sujal Vishwas Attavar v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2026 INSC 442, which reaffirmed that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be used to compel registration of an FIR where efficacious statutory remedies under the BNSS exist and have not been exhausted. In that decision, the Supreme Court also emphasised that grievances about FIR registration must first be pursued through the statutory hierarchy of the police superintendent and the Magistrate before seeking writ relief.

The bench expressly dealt with the petitioner's reliance on the Constitution Bench decision in Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., reported in AIR 2014 SC (Criminal) 66. The court agreed that Lalita Kumari makes registration mandatory under Section 154 CrPC (now Section 173 BNSS) where information discloses a cognizable offence, and that the police cannot avoid that duty. However, the bench drew a clear line: “Lalita Kumari does not sanction bypassing of statutory remedies.” The judgment in Lalita Kumari, the bench held, was rendered to ensure that the police perform their statutory obligation — not to encourage litigants to approach the High Court directly without first availing remedies under Sections 154(3) and 156(3) CrPC or their BNSS equivalents.

The bench also addressed Article 21. It acknowledged that the right to a fair investigation is part of the right to life and personal liberty, but added that sympathy cannot override procedure. The procedure under the BNSS is not a mere technicality but a substantive safeguard ensuring that grievances are addressed at the appropriate level through an independent judicial officer. Allowing litigants to bypass the statutory scheme would undermine legislative intent and encourage a culture of circumventing statutory remedies, which the bench described as detrimental to the rule of law.

The court was also unpersuaded on facts: it was disputed whether the petitioner had ever approached any police authority before filing the writ petition. No proof of receipt of the complaint letter by any police official was on record.

The Statutory Scheme Under BNSS

Section 173(4) BNSS corresponds to the earlier Section 154(3) CrPC and provides a mechanism for a person aggrieved by non-registration to escalate the complaint to a superior police officer. Section 175(3) BNSS corresponds to Section 156(3) CrPC and empowers a Magistrate to order registration of an FIR and to direct and monitor investigation. The bench read these two provisions together as a deliberate legislative design creating a structured sequence that must be followed before constitutional remedies are invoked.

The bench stated that to skip this statutory sequence and approach the High Court under Article 226 at the first instance is to treat the High Court as a forum of first instance, which is impermissible. It expressed concern about a growing trend of litigants filing such petitions in the High Court without first availing these statutory remedies, describing it as creating a mounting burden on the court's extraordinary jurisdiction.

Outcome

The Division Bench dismissed Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 20106 of 2026 as devoid of merit on 1 September 2026. The court did not find any cogent reason to exercise its extraordinary power under Article 226 to issue a mandamus directing registration of an FIR against respondent no. 4. The petitioner was granted liberty to avail appropriate remedy under law, including the statutory remedies under Section 173(4) and Section 175(3) BNSS, if so advised.