[ High Court of Judicature at Allahabad ]

Allahabad HC Stays FIR Over Fake E-mail ID, Holds Email Address Is Not a “Unique Identification Feature” Under IT Act

The Lucknow Bench held that creating an e-mail ID in another person's name does not attract Section 66-C of the IT Act and stayed FIR No. 0193 of 2026 at Pratapgarh.

Manaswi Singh — High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Lucknow Bench) — 8 September 2026

A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court sitting at Lucknow has stayed FIR/Case Crime No. 0193 of 2026, registered at Police Station Aaspur Devsara, District Pratapgarh, against two petitioners accused of creating a fake e-mail ID in a third person's name and using it to send fraudulent complaints to various authorities, including the Lok Ayukta. Justice Abdul Moin and Justice Pramod Kumar Srivastava, hearing Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 8317 of 2026, found prima facie merit in the challenge to both offences charged — criminal defamation under Section 356(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and identity theft under Section 66-C of the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008. The Bench directed that no coercive action be taken against the petitioners in pursuance of the FIR pending further orders.

The FIR and the Charges

The FIR, dated 23 July 2026, was lodged at Police Station Aaspur Devsara in Pratapgarh under two provisions: Section 356(2) of the BNS, 2023, which deals with defamation, and Section 66-C of the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008, which punishes identity theft.

The allegation in the FIR was that the petitioners knowingly created an e-mail ID in the name of a particular individual and used that e-mail ID to send fake messages and complaints to multiple persons, including the Lok Ayukta. The fourth respondent — represented by advocate Sumit Kumar Ojha, whose short counter affidavit was taken on record — pressed the view that this conduct amounted to using the unique identification feature of a third person, squarely within Section 66-C.

The Legal Challenge

Counsel for the petitioners, Anuj Dayal and Ankit Kumar Trivedi, attacked the FIR on two independent grounds.

On the defamation charge, they relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221. The argument was that, in cases of criminal defamation, an FIR cannot be filed and no direction under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be issued; the law requires proceedings to be initiated by way of a complaint filed by the person aggrieved. The FIR route, it was argued, was therefore impermissible on its face for the defamation limb.

On the identity theft charge, the petitioners argued that Section 66-C of the IT Act, 2008 uses specific language — “electronic signature, password or any other unique identification feature” — and that an e-mail ID falls into none of these categories. Creating an e-mail ID in a person's name, they contended, is not the same as using that person's electronic signature, password, or a unique identification feature. There is, they pointed out, no bar in law against creating an e-mail ID in any particular name.

How the Bench Reasoned

On the defamation count, the Bench accepted the settled position drawn from Subramanian Swamy without elaborating further, treating the point as well-established.

The more textually focused reasoning concerned Section 66-C. The Bench examined the plain language of the provision, which punishes whoever “fraudulently or dishonestly make use of electronic signature, password or any other unique identification feature of any other person.” Responding to respondent No. 4's counsel, who argued that the e-mail ID constituted a unique identification feature, the Bench held the argument to be prima facie fallacious and misconceived.

The reason was one of legislative choice: the legislature, in its wisdom, specified “electronic signature”, “password”, and “unique identification feature” as the protected categories. It did not include “e-mail ID”. Because the legislature expressly enumerated those terms and did not enumerate an e-mail address, the Bench declined to extend the provision to cover the creation of an e-mail ID, even one created in a third person's name for the purpose of sending fake complaints.

The Bench's analysis does not equate an e-mail address with the enumerated categories by analogy or by treating it as a sub-species of “unique identification feature.” The distinction matters: had an e-mail ID been held to be a unique identification feature, the conduct alleged — using the ID to impersonate and deceive — could have attracted Section 66-C. The Bench's reading forecloses that route at the threshold, at least on a prima facie basis at this stage.

Directions Issued

The Bench recorded that a prima facie case for interference had been made out on both counts. Accordingly, it passed the following directions effective 1 September 2026:

FIR/Case Crime No. 0193 of 2026, dated 23 July 2026, registered under Section 356(2) of BNS and Section 66-C of the IT (Amendment) Act, 2008 at Police Station Aaspur Devsara, District Pratapgarh, shall remain stayed until further orders.
No action shall be taken against the petitioners by the authorities in pursuance of the impugned FIR.

The Bench also granted four weeks' time to the State and respondent No. 4 to file counter affidavits, with two weeks thereafter available to the petitioners for a rejoinder. The matter is to be listed before an appropriate Bench, and the Bench expressly directed that this case shall not be treated as tied up or part-heard before the same Division Bench.

Outcome

FIR/Case Crime No. 0193 of 2026 stands stayed. No coercive steps can be taken against Krishna Kant Pandey and the second petitioner pursuant to the FIR registered at Aaspur Devsara, Pratapgarh, until the writ petition is heard further on merits.