Bombay HC quashes Chanda Kochhar sanction: only the RBI could remove an ICICI Bank MD
Justice Milind N. Jadhav held that Section 36AA of the Banking Regulation Act gives the Reserve Bank alone the power to remove a bank MD, and that the board sanction of 15 May 2023 recorded no reasons and showed no material.
The Bombay High Court on 18 November quashed the sanction under which the CBI was prosecuting Chanda Kochhar, former Managing Director of ICICI Bank, for corruption. Justice Milind N. Jadhav held that the bank’s board, which granted it on 15 May 2023, had no power to do so.
In the court’s view, the only authority competent to remove a bank’s Managing Director, and so to sanction her prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, is the Reserve Bank of India. The court also found that the board applied no mind to any material before it.
The petition asked the court to undo what followed the sanction, and the court allowed it in terms of both prayers. That included the consequential actions of the Special Court for the CBI in Special Case 874 of 2023. When the CBI asked for an eight-week stay of the judgment so that it could challenge it, the court declined.
From enquiry to Special Court case
The CBI began a preliminary enquiry against Ms Kochhar on 8 December 2017. It concerned illegal gratification she was said to have received indirectly because ICICI Bank sanctioned loans to the Videocon Group of Companies.
On 22 January 2019 the agency registered an FIR under Sections 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
In September 2020 her husband was arrested by the Enforcement Directorate under the money-laundering law, and his assets were attached on the basis of the CBI’s FIR. Ms Kochhar was arrested under that law on 12 February 2021 and released on bail by the Special Court.
On 25 March 2021 the High Court granted her husband bail. The judgment records that the court then observed that no loss had been caused to ICICI Bank by her actions.
The CBI summoned her in July 2022. She appeared on 23 December 2022 and was arrested on the ground of non-cooperation. Her Writ Petition 378 of 2023 sought to quash the FIR, and on 9 January 2023 the court directed that she and her husband be released on interim bail.
On 27 March 2023 the CBI wrote to the bank seeking sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The chargesheet was filed on 28 March 2023, and the sanction was granted on 15 May 2023.
The Special Court took cognizance on 12 July 2023. Ms Kochhar filed her petition on 4 December 2023, under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when the case was at the stage of framing of charge.
What the CBI alleges
The CBI told the court that between June 2009 and October 2011 Ms Kochhar, as Managing Director, sanctioned rupee term loans of Rs 1,875 crore to the Videocon Group. It said she knew her husband had business dealings with Venugopal Dhoot, Managing Director of Videocon.
She had not disclosed her interest, the agency said, as the bank’s credit policy required. She sat on the committee that sanctioned two of the six loans.
After a loan of Rs 300 crore to Videocon International Electronics Ltd, the CBI said, she received Rs 64 crore through NuPower Renewable Ltd, where her husband was a director.
It also said she lived in a flat owned by the Videocon Group without paying for it. The flat, valued at Rs 5.25 crore in 1996, was later transferred to her husband’s family trust for Rs 11 lakh.
The agency put the bank’s wrongful loss at Rs 1,033.39 crore. It said the Videocon loans were repaid out of fresh loans from the bank, which remain outstanding.
The petitioner: wrong authority, no material
Mr Abad Ponda, Senior Advocate for Ms Kochhar, argued that the board was not the competent authority under Section 19. Section 36AA of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 lets the Reserve Bank remove a bank’s chairman, director or chief executive officer, so the Reserve Bank was the authority, he said.
He added that Section 36AC overrides the Companies Act and the bank’s own policies. Section 35B(1)(b), he said, requires the Reserve Bank’s prior approval to terminate a Managing Director. The CBI itself had written to the Reserve Bank on 5 February 2019 seeking approval for her termination.
On the material, he said the CBI sent the board a letter and a report, and the minutes record only that the letter was circulated. A supplementary chargesheet of 4 December 2023, he said, showed that some witness statements had been recorded before the sanction but were not placed before the authority.
He also pointed to a contradiction. The sanction and the board resolution both say the bank suffered no wrongful loss and followed due process, he said, while the CBI says the loans caused heavy loss.
She sat on the committees for only two of the six loans, he added, and all six were repaid in 2012. He also said the sanction did not specify the offences.
The CBI: this belongs at trial
Mr Anil Singh, Senior Advocate, whom the judgment describes as the ASG, argued for the CBI that the petition was not maintainable. There is a clear distinction between absence of sanction and invalid sanction, he said, and the second can be decided only at trial, on evidence.
On competence, he said clause 151(a) of the bank’s Articles of Association lets the board appoint and remove a Managing Director. Section 35B(1)(b) of the Banking Regulation Act deals with termination, he said, not removal.
He added that the bank had also granted sanction under Section 17A of the Act, which Ms Kochhar had not challenged. The board had been briefed on the CBI’s findings and had consulted an eminent jurist whose opinion was circulated, he said.
He objected that her additional affidavit of 4 September 2024 raised grounds outside the petition. He also said her petition itself described the board as the competent authority.
Why the court heard it now
Justice Jadhav framed three questions: whether the court had jurisdiction, whether the board had power to grant sanction, and whether the sanction prejudiced her rights. The second, in the court’s words:
“Whether the Board of Directors of ICICI Bank were possessed with power to grant sanction under Section 19(1) of PC Act to prosecute the Petitioner?” (para 8)
On jurisdiction, the court read Section 19(3) as applying to a court sitting in appeal, confirmation or revision. This court was not doing that, it said, because Ms Kochhar had invoked its inherent power to quash the sanction.
Section 19(4) asks whether an objection could have been raised earlier. She came four months after cognizance and before charge, the court said, which met that condition.
It rejected the CBI’s objection to the additional affidavit. The petition pleaded nullity of the sanction in its Ground K, and the affidavit was filed with the court’s leave.
One of the two decisions the CBI cited on the point did not deal with a challenge to a Section 19 sanction, the court said. The other did not help it, since the petition pleaded nullity. It answered the jurisdiction question in the affirmative.
The Banking Regulation Act overrides the board
Section 19(1)(c) requires the sanction to come from the authority competent to remove the public servant. The court called both requirements, that the sanction cover offences under the Act and that it come from the competent authority, conditions to be met before the Special Court takes cognizance.
ICICI Bank is a banking company under the Banking Regulation Act. Section 5A of that Act overrides a bank’s memorandum, articles and board resolutions, and makes any repugnant provision void.
That ruled out the CBI’s reliance on the Companies Act and the Articles of Association. Accepting it, the court said, would leave Sections 5A and 36AC without any work to do.
Section 36AA(1) lets the Reserve Bank, for reasons recorded in writing, remove any chairman, director or chief executive officer when it is necessary in the public interest or for the proper management of the bank. The court read this as vesting the power of removal in the Reserve Bank and in no one else.
Section 35B(1)(b) adds that the termination of a Managing Director takes effect only with the Reserve Bank’s previous approval. Section 36AC places removals under Section 36AA above the Companies Act and any other law, contract or instrument.
No authority competent in law had granted sanction, the court said. The Reserve Bank gave no reasons and passed no order. Ms Kochhar was never given the chance to make a representation to it, which Section 36AA(2) guarantees before any removal.
The court relied on K Veeraswami v Union of India, where the Supreme Court read the competent authority to include the one without whose order the public servant cannot be removed.
The CBI, it said, ought to have approached the Reserve Bank. The court accepted that she could face an inquiry under the bank’s own rules, but not that the board could sanction a prosecution under the anti-corruption law.
Her own petition did not bind her
The CBI relied on the first paragraph of the petition, which described the board as the competent authority. The court called the submission naive and rejected it at the outset.
There is no estoppel against a statute, it said, and an admission that is untenable in law cannot be accepted blindly. The averment was a reference to what happened, the court held, and it put the wording down to improper drafting of the petition.
Absence of sanction cannot wait for trial
The CBI said the validity of sanction should be left to the trial court. It relied on Parkash Singh Badal v State of Punjab, Dinesh Kumar and Ashok Kumar Aggarwal.
The court drew on the same Badal passage to separate two things. Absence of sanction can be raised at the threshold, while invalidity from non-application of mind is for trial.
Here the plea was absence of sanction, the court held, because the board never had the power to grant it. It relied on three Supreme Court decisions: Shankar Moitra v Sadhna Das, Abdul Wahab Ansari v State of Bihar and Nanjappa v State of Karnataka.
Citing the three-judge bench in Ansari, it said it could not accept the CBI’s reading of the other cases. Without a valid sanction, the Special Court cannot take cognizance of offences to which Section 19 applies, and that is a pure jurisdictional fact.
From Nanjappa the court took the rule that a valid sanction is a condition precedent to the competence of the Special Judge. Where it is not granted by the competent authority, the trial is non est.
Leaving the question to trial would put a public servant through the ignominy of a trial that might later be vitiated, the court said. That would defeat the purpose of Section 19, which is to protect against vexatious prosecution.
A sanction by a board with no power to remove her was therefore prima facie void from the beginning, and nothing later could validate it. The court did not reach the failure-of-justice test in Section 19(3), since there was no valid sanction at all.
Board saw only the CBI letter and report
The court then took up the second ground, non-application of mind. The CBI’s request letter and the extract of the board’s 291st meeting are annexed to the petition. The sanction of 15 May 2023 gives no reasons and merely refers to the CBI’s report and letter.
Both documents also record that the bank suffered no financial loss, the court noted, which was the bank’s stand throughout. It found no application of mind in them.
Only the CBI’s letter and report were circulated to the board, the court found. The material collected in the investigation was never placed before it, and the court said the board ought to have called for it.
The court set out the propositions in CBI v Ashok Kumar Aggarwal. The prosecution must send the whole record, including material that may tilt the balance towards the accused, and the authority must scrutinise it independently.
The sanction order must also make it evident that the authority knew all the relevant material. None of this was followed, the court said. On the record before it:
“not an ounce of evidence to show that the sanctioning authority considered any material” (para 42)
Neither the minutes nor the sanction discussed the evidence against her. The court cited State of Karnataka v Ameerjan for the rule that the whole material must go before the sanctioning authority.
The bank’s own no-loss stand
The court added a second reason why the sanction could not stand. Both the sanction and the minutes record that the bank’s rules were not contravened in the two loans and that no wrongful loss was caused.
The CBI could not approbate and reprobate at the same time, the court said. Ms Kochhar was also not the sole member of the committee that granted the two loans.
Cognizance falls with the sanction
A sanction by an incompetent authority is illegal and a nullity, the court held. The cognizance the Special Court took on the strength of it was illegal and had to be set aside. The court’s conclusion on the sanction:
“unsustainable in law being a nullity” (para 47)
It cited Baij Nath Prasad Tripathi v State of Bhopal, where the Supreme Court held that a trial without a legal sanction is null and void. The Special Court should not have taken cognizance mechanically, the court said.
It should have looked at the sanction to see whether the authority that granted it was competent. Though the trial had not begun, cognizance on a defective sanction nullified the past and future procedure, the court said.
Order
The writ petition is allowed and disposed of. The sanction order of 15 May 2023, granted under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act to prosecute Ms Kochhar in CBI Case RCBD1/2019/E/0001/BSFB, is held to be a nullity and is quashed and set aside.
The petition is allowed in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b). Clause (b) sought to quash the consequential actions of the Special Court for CBI at Greater Bombay in CBI Special Case 874 of 2023.
After the judgment was pronounced, Mr Patil, advocate for the CBI, asked for a stay of eight weeks to enable the agency to challenge it. The court declined, for the reasons given in the judgment.