Only 3 of 52 witnesses examined, yet Calcutta HC denies UAPA bail: not at Najeeb melting point
A Division Bench held that chats with foreign handlers and recruitment of youth went beyond mere possession of literature, and that delay caused partly by a discharge application had not reached the point that overrides Section 43D(5).
Three of 52 prosecution witnesses have been examined, and the accused has been in custody since 6 January 2023. On 13 November the Calcutta High Court still refused him bail under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, holding that his case has not reached the "melting point" that lets a court override the statutory bar.
A Division Bench of Justice Arijit Banerjee and Justice Apurba Sinha Ray dismissed CRA (DB) 324 of 2025, filed by Md. Saddam, also called Saddam Mallick. Justice Apurba Sinha Ray wrote the judgment and Justice Banerjee agreed. The Bench found material of active recruitment, not mere possession of literature.
What the prosecution says he did
The National Investigation Agency told the court the appellant was no passive sympathiser but an active ISIS operator. Its case was that he recruited and radicalised youths, spread propaganda, and ran clandestine Telegram groups to send recruits to Afghanistan and Khorasan for terrorist training.
The extraction report from his devices, the agency said, showed contact with entities in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and other countries, through a virtual phone number on internet-based services. It also showed him circulating violent propaganda videos to other youths. A prosecution witness, Farhan Javed, corroborated this.
The agency named Abdul Raqib Qureshi as his link for planning and coordination. It also identified a Singapore resident, Amina Bint Munnavar, as a key radicaliser and administrator of ISIS-linked groups.
The defence: possession is not an offence
Senior Advocate Deep Chaim Kabir argued that the delay alone justified bail on any terms. The trial had barely begun, and a chance of early conclusion did not exist. He said the grounds of arrest were never communicated, citing K.A. Najeeb.
On the merits, he argued that mere possession of images, videos or literature is no offence. He cited Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India and Vernon v. State of Maharashtra, where the Supreme Court said association with a terrorist organisation must come with an intention to further its activities.
In Thwaha Fasal, he said, the Supreme Court observed that young accused might be fascinated by a banned group's ideas and hold its books in soft or hard form. Vernon held that holding literature through which violent acts may be propagated does not by itself attract Section 15(1)(b).
Farhan, he said, held the same material on his phone yet became a witness and not an accused. The agency's distinction was arbitrary, he argued. At best the appellant too had been radicalised by a co-accused.
Chain of custody and the statute's wording
Counsel said electronic evidence demands a strict chain of custody, including hash values, certified extraction and mirror images. The prosecution had not shown any of that, he argued, and no subscriber details tied the appellant to the Telegram and WhatsApp accounts.
He also argued that Section 43D(5) of the Act is worded differently from Section 45 of the PMLA and Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It asks only whether the accusation is prima facie true on the case diary or the Section 173 report, not whether the accused is not guilty.
The appellant, a youth of 28, had also sought discharge, which he was entitled to do. That, counsel said, could not dilute his Article 21 right.
His list of authorities ran to 27 decisions. It included Supreme Court orders of May 2026 in Tasleem Ahmed and Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, and two Calcutta High Court Division Bench rulings in Mansur Ali and Md. Imadul Haque.
The prosecution relied on Watali, Gurwinder Singh, Gulfisha Fatima and Najeeb, and on a 2026 Supreme Court ruling in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh. It argued that Section 43D(5) squarely applied and that the appellant's own case at the highest attracted Sections 38 and 39.
The test the court set itself
The Bench framed its task in a single sentence:
“The present task of this court under section 43D(5) of UAPA is to find out whether the materials brought against the applicant by the investigating agency is sufficient to hold at this stage that the accusation against him is prima facie true or not.” (para 13)
Why this was more than possession
The court read the extraction reports as showing Telegram messages, through virtual numbers, with persons outside India. The chats spoke of engaging Indian youth abroad for militant purposes, and the sender was eager, the court said, to carry out serious militant activity in India, such as killing journalists.
The court said that distinguished the case from Vernon. This was not mere possession of literature. The materials showed overt acts of collecting and organising youth, which also met the Thwaha Fasal condition that association be shown by active participation.
The Bench added that a large number of videos and pictures showed killings and training of militants. The videos also showed planning to kill the Prime Minister and a United States President, the court recorded.
Delay: the "melting point" not reached
The court turned to Najeeb, which holds that Section 43D(5) does not by itself oust a constitutional court's power to grant bail where the trial will not finish in a reasonable time. The question was when that point arrives.
The chargesheet was filed on 4 July 2023 and charge was framed on 14 August 2025. Cross-examination of witnesses was deferred by the appellant under Section 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, presumably because he did not want to disclose his defence.
The appellant then filed a discharge application. After the trial judge rejected it, the appeal was filed, and examination of prosecution witnesses was halted meanwhile. The Bench said the right to apply for discharge is real but the work of the courts means it takes time.
No fault found with the prosecution
The Bench found no intentional laches by the prosecution to prolong the trial. It cited Gulfisha Fatema and Tasleem Ahmed for the view that delay cannot automatically be attributed to the prosecution.
Given the gravity of the offences and the nature of the technical and electronic evidence, 52 chargesheet witnesses could not be called excessive. The discharge application, though lawful, had consumed much time and contributed to prolonging the trial.
Grounds of arrest and the witness parity plea
On the grounds of arrest, the Bench noted that the appellant was arrested on 6 January 2023. That was before the Supreme Court decided Pankaj Bansal on 3 October 2023, and before Shoma Kanti Sen and Prabir Purkayastha. For this case, mandatory compliance was therefore a matter of academic interest, it said.
On Farhan, the court relied on his statement under Section 164 of the Code. He had come to Howrah as a student, met the appellant at a mosque, and received the material from him with a request for secrecy.
The two did not stand on the same footing, the court held. The appellant, it said, took advantage of proximity to indoctrinate a student, which supported the prosecution case of continuous encouragement from foreign contacts.
No mini-trial at the bail stage
The court recalled that Watali and Najeeb both bar a threadbare evaluation of evidence or a mini-trial. The defence points on chain of custody and parity could not be settled without a trial.
The Bench held that there were sufficient materials of overt acts to find the accusation prima facie true. It concluded:
“the case has not reached the melting point” (para 20)
Order
CRA (DB) 324 of 2025 was dismissed and the bail prayer rejected. The court noted that the matter concerns the security of the country.
Parties were told to act on the server copy of the order from the High Court website. Urgent certified copies were allowed on compliance with formalities.