PANAMA blades suit skips mediation as Calcutta HC lets interim pleas be filed with the plaint
A Division Bench held that continuing infringement justified dispensing with pre-institution mediation despite delay arguments, and set aside a registry Office Order that barred filing interim applications together with a plaint.
A shaving-blade maker says it has sold under the name PANAMA since 1951 and found a rival using the word in September 2026. On 13 November the Calcutta High Court held that this continuing wrong justified skipping pre-suit mediation.
The Division Bench also struck down a registry rule that stopped litigants filing injunction applications together with their plaints.
Justice Debangsu Basak wrote the judgment for himself and Justice Ajay Kumar Gupta. It was delivered the day the appeal was heard. The Bench restored the plaint, admitted it subject to scrutiny, and left the injunction itself to be decided separately.
A 1954 mark and a September discovery
Malhotra International Private Limited, the appellant, sued Rohan Malhotra and others for infringement and passing off. It said it manufactures and sells shaving blades under the name PANAMA since 1951, and on its documents since at least 1954.
It holds a registered trademark in the word PANAMA. The respondents have applied for rectification, which the appellant is contesting before the Registrar, who has not yet decided.
According to the appellant, the respondents began marketing blades under the same name from September 2026. It filed the plaint on 9 October 2026, and it was sought to be presented before the Commercial Division on 14 October.
The Single Judge returned the plaint
The appeal was against an order of 14 October 2026 in TEMPAPO-IPD 7/2026. The Single Judge declined to dispense with pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
The Single Judge directed that the plaint be returned with court fees and the suit de-registered. He therefore did not consider the prayers for leave under Clause 14 of the Letters Patent, 1865 and Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
According to the appellant, the Single Judge found no case for infringement that would justify dispensation, though he saw an arguable case in passing off.
What the appellant argued
Senior Advocate Debnath Ghosh, for the appellant, argued that the Single Judge applied the wrong principles. Dispensation under Section 12A, he said, is judged on the plaint and its documents, as the Supreme Court held in Patil Automation, Yamini Manohar, Dhanbad Fuels and Novenco Building and Industry.
On infringement, he said the appellant could sue until the rectification application was decided against it. On passing off, it was the prior user.
He also argued that contesting the rectification application gave no cause of action. Relying on K. Narayanan v. S. Murli, he said the appellant only came across the offending goods in September.
An injunction application had been prepared, he said, but the registry would not accept it with the plaint.
The respondents: a January launch
Counsel for respondent no. 3 said the respondents had been making and selling PANAMA blades since 20 January 2026. The appellant knew this, they argued, and the October plaint came late. The Court had therefore rightly refused dispensation.
The Bench noted that the respondents need not have been heard at this stage. It heard them anyway because of an office order on filing practice.
The office order behind the registry refusal
The Bench traced the rule. On 26 March 2025, in CS No. 38 of 2025, a Single Judge directed the registry not to register an interlocutory application without the plaint being presented, unless the plaint was admitted or leave was taken beforehand.
On 20 January 2026 the Registrar-in-Charge, Original Side, issued an Office Order directing the Central Filing Department to comply. It followed a representation of 7 February 2025 from the President of the Incorporated Law Society, a wing of the Bar.
The Bench asked the Society's President to explain. He told the court that the representation actually asked for the opposite of the Office Order's final direction. Bar members were struggling to file injunction applications along with plaints, which was inimical to litigants.
He asked that the direction be set aside. If a plaint was not admitted, he said, the interim applications would meet the same fate.
A rule set aside by consensus
The Bench also invited the plaintiff in CS 38 of 2025 to address it on the March 2025 order. At the Bar the consensus was clear, the court recorded: the direction put needless fetters on a litigant's right to approach the court.
Counsel suggested that the registry accept such filings, subject to just objections it could place in writing before the court considering the plaint. The Bench agreed, set aside the direction in the Office Order, and held:
“file any interim application simultaneously/together with the filing of the plaint” (para 21)
The Bench said the Office Order, as it stood, was likely to defeat both the request for urgent interim relief and its grant. A plaintiff may need to come with the plaint to seek urgent relief.
Section 12A: mandatory, but with a door
There was no dispute that the suit fell within Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) of the 2015 Act, the clause under which infringement and passing off suits fall, or that it exceeded the Specified Value under Section 7. Section 12A is mandatory, the Bench said, citing the four Supreme Court rulings.
Those rulings also say a plaintiff who shows a case for urgent interim relief need not first mediate. The Bench set out Dhanbad Fuels, which says leave of the court is not required, and the test is whether urgent relief is contemplable from the plaintiff's standpoint.
It quoted Novenco on the other side: a pro forma prayer for urgent relief, used as a device to skip mediation, will be ignored. Real urgency can be seen from immediacy of peril, irreparable harm or the risk of losing rights.
From these, it culled three yardsticks. The plaint and its documents are read from the plaintiff's standpoint, failure ultimately to get interim relief is not fatal, and courts must guard against urgency used as a guise.
Why trademark suits are different
The Bench gave its own reading of why Section 12A exists. Mediation preserves existing relationships between contracting parties, which litigation might destroy or disturb.
Of the 21 commercial disputes listed in Section 2(1)(c), clause (xvii) stands out. Infringement and passing off involve no pre-existing commercial relationship, so there is no relationship for mediation to save.
The court added a limit. Falling under clause (xvii) does not make dispensation automatic, and each case depends on its facts, though the yardstick for such suits differs from the other clauses.
January or September: a fact for trial
The court identified two dates in dispute: 20 January 2026, when the respondents claim to have entered the market, and September 2026, when the appellant says it learned of their goods. It called this an issue of fact for the injunction petition.
The question did not need to detain the court at the Section 12A stage, it held, where the plaint and documents read from the plaintiff's standpoint make out a case. K. Narayanan, it added, suggests a plaintiff cannot sue merely on an application for registration unless it finds offending goods in the market.
A continuing wrong outweighs delay
The Bench relied on Novenco again. A prayer for injunction in a continuing infringement is not camouflage to evade mediation, and mere delay in filing suit does not negate urgency when infringement continues.
It also noted that a Coordinate Bench decision of 12 October 2026 in ITC Limited v. SMM Tobacco Private Limited had been stayed by the Supreme Court on 4 November 2026. The Bench said it was bound by the Supreme Court authorities. It concluded:
“the infringement alleged is continuing wrong” (para 42)
On that footing, the court said, preventing the ongoing injury needed consideration, particularly given the public interest in preventing deception.
Order
The impugned order was set aside and the appellant was granted leave under Section 12A. The plaint was admitted subject to scrutiny, and the registry was told to proceed on the initial suit number allotted.
The respondents must show cause why leave under Clause 14 of the Letters Patent will not be granted. Leave under Order II Rule 2 of the Code was granted.
TEMPAPO-IPD/7/2026 and the connected application were disposed of without costs. The court did not enter the merits of the injunction contentions, which stay open for the injunction petition.