Charges framed before papers arrived: Calcutta HC sets 60-day discharge window in POCSO trials
Dr Justice Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee held that the date an accused receives all prosecution documents starts the 60-day period under Section 250 of the BNSS in POCSO trials, and set aside a charge order passed without the missing papers.
On 24 October 2025 a POCSO court in Chandannagore ordered the prosecution to give an accused four seizure lists and medical reports he had not received. The papers never came. On 3 December the same court framed charges against him. On 13 November 2026 the Calcutta High Court set that order aside.
Dr Justice Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, sitting alone on the Appellate Side, went further. He laid down six steps for Special Courts trying cases under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, built on one rule. The accused’s 60 days to seek discharge run from the day he is served every prosecution document.
Charges framed on a date set for papers
The petitioner, Suvradip Halder, was charged under Sections 127(2) and 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita read with Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act. The charge sheet was filed on 9 September 2025. He challenged the order of 3 December 2025 of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Chandannagore, Hooghly.
On 24 September 2025 he had applied for some missing prosecution papers. On 24 October the trial court allowed that prayer and directed the prosecution to supply copies, including four seizure lists and medical reports. It fixed 17 November for supply of the copies and for consideration of charge.
He could not be produced on 17 November, so the court fixed 3 December for the same two things. On that date, the High Court noted, the trial court took up the charge without addressing supply of the missing documents. It framed charges the same day.
What the accused and the State argued
Mr Ayan Bhattacharjee appeared for the petitioner. He argued that no opportunity was given to address the court before charge, no one asked whether he meant to seek discharge, and no separate date was fixed for it. Framing of charge, he said, is a critical judicial exercise and not a formality.
He said the charge was framed on the first date the petitioner was shown present, after repeated adjournments caused only by non-supply of documents. The discharge right under the BNSS, he argued, is a filter against vexatious prosecutions. Even under a special law like POCSO, expedition cannot cost fairness.
Mr Gouranga Kumar Das appeared for the State and placed the case diary. He pointed out that a court must frame a charge in writing within 60 days of the first hearing on charge, but that Section 35 of the POCSO Act requires the child’s evidence to be recorded within 30 days of cognizance.
Section 35, he said, overrides Section 250(1) of the BNSS because of Section 31 of the POCSO Act. The trial court was therefore justified in framing charges, so that Section 35 was not breached.
Supplying papers is the court’s duty
The court began with the record. Charges were framed without supplying the copies the trial court had itself ordered on 24 October 2025. That was evident from the sequence of dates.
Supply of prosecution papers, the judge held, is an obligation of the court, as the language of Section 232 read with Sections 230 and 231 of the BNSS shows. The court must be satisfied that copies have been supplied before it goes further in a case.
The judge tested the trial court’s procedure against Sections 250 and 251, and called the moot question one that pertains to:
“the time limit by which accused would be entitled to file discharge application and the next question i.e. from which stage, time will be reckoned to exercise such right by the accused” (para 23)
A 60-day clock that did not exist before
Section 250(1) of the BNSS lets the accused seek discharge within 60 days of commitment of the case under Section 232. Section 227 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure had no such limit. Section 251, on framing of charge, is identical to old Section 228 except for a new 60-day limit from the first hearing on charge.
The difficulty is that POCSO Special Courts take cognizance without commitment. Section 33(1) of the POCSO Act lets them act on a police report directly. So the court asked how the 60 days are to be counted.
For warrant cases on a police report, Section 262(1) of the BNSS gives 60 days from the supply of copies under Section 230. Taking aid from it, the court held that where no committal is contemplated the period under Section 250(1) runs from supply of the prosecution papers.
Thirty days for the child, sixty for discharge
The court accepted that the issue is complicated. Section 35(1) of the POCSO Act says the child’s evidence shall be recorded within 30 days of cognizance. Section 31 makes the criminal procedure code applicable save as otherwise provided. Read plainly, the judge said, Section 35 overrides the 60-day provisions.
The petitioner asked whether the later BNSS overrides the earlier POCSO Act on this point. The court noted that POCSO has no provision on framing of charge or discharge, so nothing bars following the BNSS. Section 33(9) lets a Special Court try offences as a Court of Session would, following that procedure.
The special court, after taking cognizance, must therefore frame charge under the BNSS. The only open question was when the accused can seek discharge. The 60-day limit, the judge said, exists to give the accused time, with the papers in hand, to prepare a discharge application and protect his right to a fair trial under Article 21.
Fast tracking must not bury justice
The court cited Md. Hussain v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), which separates the right to speedy trial from the accused’s right to fair trial. It also cited Anokhilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, where the Supreme Court said the process may be expedited but fast tracking must not bury the cause of justice.
The judge drew the settled position from them. Early disposal is an integral part of a fair trial in such cases, but:
“attempts to expedite the trial should not be at the cost of fairness” (para 22)
Later general law against earlier special law
The right to prefer a discharge application within a reasonable period after receiving the papers, the court held, is an unalienable facet of Article 21. Denying it on technical grounds denies a fair trial. Section 4(2) of the BNSS applies its time frame to offences under other laws, subject to any enactment regulating the procedure.
No special procedure on charge or discharge exists in POCSO. In its absence, Sections 250(1) and 262(1) apply under the later general legislation. The judge cited Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India and S. Prakash v. K.M. Kurian on when a later general law prevails over a special one.
Banerjee’s four tests include that a later general law overrides a prior special law where the two are so repugnant they cannot co-exist. A special law stays untouched only where there is no clear inconsistency. S. Prakash said a general provision that is clear, unqualified and meant as a universal rule prevails over a special one.
If the intention was a rule of universal application in the interest of fair trial, the court said, the later provision follows. There was no reasonable explanation, it added, why an accused in a POCSO case should get less time than people accused of lesser offences.
The court also relied on legislation by reference. Section 31 of the POCSO Act refers to the old Code of Criminal Procedure, so later changes in that law apply through Section 8 of the General Clauses Act.
It drew on Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India v. Satyanarayan Bankatlal Malu and Girnar Traders (3) for the distinction from legislation by incorporation, where the provisions are bodily transplanted and later changes do not follow.
The judge added that Sections 250 and 251 are no mere ritual. The trial court cannot act as a post office of the prosecution, and must evaluate the record. In his words, the provisions:
“are not empty formalities” (para 30)
When the 60 days start to run
Both Section 250(1), which speaks of commitment, and Section 262(1), which speaks of supply of copies, point the same way. The 60 days should be reckoned from service of the prosecution documents.
The court read the duty to supply copies as a duty to supply a full set. It must cover the documents the prosecution wants to rely on during trial.
Six steps for POCSO Special Courts
First, because POCSO prescribes no commitment, the date of service of copies of all the prosecution documents to be relied on at trial is treated as the date of commitment for Section 250(1) of the BNSS.
Second, immediately after taking cognizance, when the accused appears or is brought before the court, he must forthwith be given those copies under Section 231 of the BNSS, if not already given.
Third, the accused may apply for discharge within 60 days after that under Section 250(1). Fourth, if he does not want to apply, he must say so in writing, and the court must then proceed immediately to hear the charge.
Fifth, if he applies within 60 days, the court must consider it under Section 250(2) after a reasonable hearing of both sides. It must decide it forthwith, and in any case within 60 days of filing.
Sixth, unless the accused is discharged, the court must proceed to hear the charge within 60 days after that.
Order
Applying this to the case, the court found that the trial court had framed the charge hurriedly and mechanically, without supplying the complete set of documents it had itself directed on 24 October 2025. The order could not be sustained in law.
CRR 307 of 2026 was allowed on 13 November 2026, after being heard on 20 July 2026. The order of 3 December 2025 framing charges was set aside.
The trial court must supply a complete set of copies, including the missing documents the prosecution will rely on, within two weeks of communication of the order. If the accused wants to seek discharge, he must apply within 60 days after that.
If he does not, he must say so immediately after receiving the copies, and the trial court must go straight to hearing the charge. If he applies, the court must dispose of the application within 60 days of its filing.