Delhi HC leaves no-remission life term intact though the mercy plea waited over 15 years
A Division Bench led by Justice Navin Chawla held that the President knew of the delay and had the Attorney General view in front of him, so the court could test only how the clemency power was used.
A mercy petition filed on 27 June 2001 was decided on 18 September 2016. The President commuted a Pune murder convict’s death sentence to life imprisonment, but ordered that he stay in prison for the rest of his natural life with no remission by any authority.
On 17 November, the Delhi High Court dismissed his challenge to that condition. It said the long wait might have been enough to commute the sentence, but the file showed the President was aware of it and chose the terms of commutation himself.
Seven killed in Pune in August 1994
Jitendra alias Jitu Nainsingh Gehlot was the second accused in a robbery and killing at a flat in Kothrud, Pune. The Supreme Court’s account, which the High Court reproduced, says five women, one of them pregnant, and two children were killed.
He was arrested on 21 November 1994. The Additional Sessions Judge, Pune, convicted him on 19 February 1998 under Sections 302, 120-B, 397, 449 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code.
On 23 February 1998 the trial court sentenced him to death for murder and to seven years each for the Section 397 and Section 449 offences. It added one year for wrongful confinement, with the sentences to run concurrently.
The Bombay High Court confirmed the death sentence on 22 July 1999. The Supreme Court dismissed his appeal on 5 September 2000 and his review petition on 24 November 2000.
A mercy petition that went back and forth
He sent a mercy petition to the President through Yerawada Central Prison on 27 June 2001. Getting no reply, he wrote again on 2 November 2004 through an advocate.
The Ministry of Home Affairs received that letter on 10 November 2004. On 23 December 2004 it asked the Maharashtra Home Department whether the Governor had considered a mercy petition under Article 161.
The State replied on 18 March 2006 that he had never sent one to the Governor. On 23 March 2006 the Ministry said the Governor must decide first and sent the petition back to the State for that purpose.
Reminders followed on 10 July 2006, 6 May 2008, 24 September 2009 and 20 March 2013. In between, the State told the Ministry on 26 February 2013 that a fire in its offices on 21 June 2012 had destroyed files on several prisoners, including him.
On 14 February 2014 the Ministry wrote that about 10 years had been lost through the State’s delay, without justification. The Governor rejected the petition on 15 March 2014.
The petitioner said nobody told him. He learnt of the Governor’s decision only from a reply dated 22 November 2016 to a Right to Information application he filed on 3 November 2016.
Home Minister said reject, Attorney General said commute
In July 2015 the Home Minister recommended rejecting the petition as devoid of merit. The President’s office then sought a clarification on how the delay criteria in Shatrughan Chauhan v Union of India applied, and on 12 August 2015 the State was asked again to explain the delay.
On 1 January 2016 the President asked the Ministry to obtain the Attorney General’s opinion on that decision. The Attorney General gave it on 11 February 2016, saying there was huge unexplained delay at every stage and recommending commutation to life imprisonment.
The Home Minister disagreed on 7 March 2016 and again recommended rejection. The file, with both views, reached the President’s Secretariat on 18 March 2016.
On 18 September 2016 the President commuted the sentence, with the condition that he remain in prison for the remainder of his natural life and that there be no further remission by any authority. The Nagpur Central Jail Superintendent conveyed this on 15 October 2016.
He pleaded delay and solitary confinement
Mr Rajshekar Rao, Senior Advocate, led for the petitioner. He argued that Article 226 allows review of a presidential order for arbitrariness, and said Ramasrey v State of Uttar Pradesh (2026 INSC 764) did not oust that power.
He counted an unexplained delay of 11 years and 11 months, and 15 years and 3 months cumulatively. Such delay amounts to torture under Article 21, he said, relying on Shatrughan Chauhan and State of Maharashtra v Pradeep Yashwant Kokade.
He added that the petitioner had been in custody for over 31 years and in solitary single-cell confinement for over 18 years since the death sentence in 1998. That alone, he said, entitled him to unconditional commutation.
The 2001 petition, with his family and social background, was never considered, he said, and only the 2004 letter was decided. The President also did not seek the material that the clemency guidelines call for, such as his jail conduct and health records.
He pointed to educational and vocational qualifications the petitioner earned in prison as evidence of reform. He also argued that the condition leaves him no hope of returning to society.
On the condition itself, he said the President’s power carries no non-obstante clause, so it cannot take away the Governor’s power or the statutory power of remission. He relied on Union of India v V Sriharan to say that the right to seek remission continues even where a court bars it.
The Union’s reply: accept it whole
Mr Vikram Jetly, Central Government Standing Counsel, appeared for the Union with the Ministry’s Under Secretary. He said the Article 72 power lies in the President’s exclusive domain and cannot be fettered by statute.
Judicial review of it, he accepted, is possible but limited to exceptional cases, and the grounds in Epuru Sudhakar were not met. A convict who has been spared the gallows, he argued, cannot accept the commutation and attack its condition.
He also pointed out that on 13 November 2017 the Supreme Court issued notice in Union of India v Sonu Sardar. That petition challenges a Delhi High Court ruling which allowed a challenge to the rejection of a mercy petition by the President and a Governor, and it was still pending.
Territorial jurisdiction: settled in one paragraph
The respondents also objected that the court lacked territorial jurisdiction. The bench rejected this briefly.
The order under challenge arose from a decision of the President under Article 72, whose office is in Delhi, and the cause of action arose in Delhi. The objection had no merit, it held.
How far courts can review mercy orders
Justice Chawla, writing for the bench, began with Shatrughan Chauhan. Where a challenge to an Article 72 or Article 161 order rests on Article 21, a petition under Article 32 is maintainable, and so, the High Court said, is one under Article 226.
The Supreme Court had called the clemency power a constitutional responsibility, not a matter of grace. Review is limited: the decision itself may not be reviewable, but the manner of exercising the power is.
The power must not be used mala fide or for political reasons, and it must weigh all relevant material, including supervening events. Delay is one of the main grounds for review.
The bench then set out the law on delay from Pradeep Yashwant Kokade. Undue, unexplained and inordinate delay in executing a death sentence can lead to commutation, and gravity of the crime cannot excuse agonising delay.
It noted that the same case allows a convict to approach a High Court under Article 226 on the same principles. No fixed period makes a delay inordinate, as that depends on the facts.
The five grounds in Ramasrey
The bench quoted Ramasrey for the limits of review. A court may interfere only where the order was passed without application of mind, or was mala fide.
The other grounds are that it rested on extraneous or wholly irrelevant considerations, that relevant material was kept out of consideration, or that it suffers from arbitrariness.
The bench also set out how Ramasrey dealt with sentences of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life. It reproduced the passages on Swamy Shraddananda and the Constitution Bench in Sriharan, where a majority upheld a special category of sentence placed beyond remission.
Where a sentence is for life without remission, the passage says, the State’s statutory power under Section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code is displaced, and that cannot be called offensive to the Constitution. It added that arguing such sentences are invalid is a misuse of process.
Why the 15-year delay did not decide it
Applying that test, the High Court recorded that on the facts there could be no dispute:
“there can be no dispute that there has been an inordinate delay” (para 60)
The petition filed on 27 June 2001 was decided only on 18 September 2016 and communicated on 15 October 2016, after more than 15 years. The sword of death, the bench said, hung over him throughout, and he also said he had been kept in solitary confinement.
That, the bench said, might have been sufficient ground to commute the death sentence. But the file produced by the Central Government counsel showed that the President knew of the delay.
It was for that reason, the court noted, that the President expressly sought the Attorney General’s advice on Shatrughan Chauhan. The Attorney General advised commutation, and the President also had the Home Ministry’s recommendation to reject.
The President considered both views and passed the impugned order. It commuted the death sentence but directed imprisonment for the remainder of natural life with no remission, and the bench noted that it had already held that the President has that power.
Review, not appeal
The court repeated that only the manner of exercise of the power, and not the order itself, can be reviewed. Once the President had all relevant inputs and weighed the relevant factors, it said, the court could not substitute his view merely because it might have decided differently. Of the power it exercises, it said:
“power exercised by this Court is not of appeal but of judicial review” (para 63)
The judgment does not separately rule on the solitary-confinement claim or on the reformation material. It does not deal with the pending Supreme Court petition in Sonu Sardar.
Order
The writ petition is dismissed, and the pending application, CRL.M.A. 17911/2017, is disposed of as infructuous. The Court Master must return the record of the mercy petition, retained by the court on an earlier date, to Mr Sunil Kumar Singh, Under Secretary (Judicial), Ministry of Home Affairs.
There is no order as to costs. The petition had sought a declaration that the no-remission condition is unconstitutional and commutation to life imprisonment subject to remission powers.