Delhi HC reverses order setting aside 2018 award without first checking Section 34 limitation
A Division Bench held that the objection to a unilaterally appointed arbitrator could be reached only if the Section 34 challenge was filed in time, and sent the case back to the Commercial Court.
A Delhi commercial court annulled an arbitral award because the sole arbitrator had been appointed unilaterally. It never decided whether the challenge to the award was filed in time. On 17 November the Delhi High Court held that this was the wrong order of questions and sent the objections back.
Justice Avneesh Jhingan wrote the oral judgment for a Division Bench with Justice Shail Jain. The bench set aside the Commercial Court’s judgment of 13 April 2023 and allowed the appeal by Telecommunication Consultants India Limited.
A back-to-back contract and an ex parte award
Telecommunication Consultants India Limited won a tender invited by the Madhya Pradesh Rural Road Development Authority. It signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Rajput Construction on 18 October 2007.
The MoU provided that the work would go to Rajput Construction once the Authority accepted the bid. On 7 December 2007 the work was awarded to it on a back-to-back basis.
The parties’ terms provided for arbitration. Telecommunication Consultants invoked it on 7 April 2014 and a sole arbitrator was appointed. The proceedings ended in an ex parte award on 15 May 2018.
Two competing objections
Rajput Construction filed objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on 27 May 2019. The appellant raised a preliminary point that the objections were time-barred.
The respondent said it received a copy of the award for the first time on 1 March 2019, under the Right to Information Act, 2005. It also challenged the unilateral appointment of the arbitrator.
The Commercial Court at the Saket Courts set the award aside because it was rendered by a unilaterally appointed sole arbitrator. It did not deal with limitation.
Nullity against the clock
Mr Nikhilesh Krishnan, for the appellant, argued that the objections came after the 120-day period. The Commercial Court, he said, could not have entertained them without first deciding limitation.
Ms Mercy Hussain, for the respondent, argued that the appointment violated Section 12(5) of the Act. She relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Bhadra International (India) Private Limited v Airports Authority of India (2026 INSC 6) to say the award was a nullity and was rightly set aside.
The judgment records that reliance but does not discuss the decision.
Three months, then thirty days, then nothing
The court reproduced Section 34(3). An application to set aside an award cannot be made after three months from the date the applicant received it. The proviso lets a court entertain it within a further 30 days if sufficient cause is shown, “but not thereafter”.
That wording, the bench said, brings the limit within Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and ousts Section 5. The court can condone delay only for 30 days beyond the three months.
The bench called the issue no longer res integra and listed four Supreme Court decisions.
Four Supreme Court rulings on outer limits
In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department ((2008) 7 SCC 169), the Supreme Court held that a special statute giving a period and a capped extension prevails. For Section 34(3), that means Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply.
Singh Enterprises v. CCE ((2008) 3 SCC 70) concerned the appeal provision in central excise law. An appellate authority entertaining an appeal after 60 days could condone delay only up to a further 30 days, and no more.
In Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v Hongo India ((2009) 5 SCC 791), the Supreme Court said the same of appeals and references to the High Court under the excise provisions. The 180-day period had no room for condonation beyond it.
Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission ((2010) 5 SCC 23) dealt with appeals to the Supreme Court under the Electricity Act. A 60-day period with a further period of up to 60 days meant an outer limit of 120 days.
Limitation first, appointment second
Justice Jhingan found that the Commercial Court had not examined whether the objections were filed within the period in Section 34(3). The challenge to the sole arbitrator under Section 12(5) could be taken up only if the objections were in time.
The court put the error plainly:
“The Commercial Court erred in not deciding the issue of limitation” (para 8)
The High Court did not decide whether the objections were in time. It also did not rule on the Section 12(5) argument or on the effect of the respondent’s claim that it got the award on 1 March 2019.
Order
The impugned judgment of 13 April 2023 is set aside. The objections go back to the Commercial Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law.
Because the award dates from 2018, the court directed the parties or their authorised representatives to appear before the Commercial Court on 14 December 2026. The Commercial Court must make a sincere endeavour to decide the objections as expeditiously as possible. The appeal is allowed.