Telangana High Court Sets Aside Divorce Decree: Husband Failed to Prove Cruelty, Irretrievable Breakdown Not a Statutory Ground

A Division Bench set aside a Family Court decree that dissolved a marriage on irretrievable breakdown, holding that neither the Family Court nor the High Court can grant divorce on that ground, and that the husband’s cruelty allegations were entirely uncorroborated.

A Division Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana, comprising Justice K. Lakshman and Justice K. Sujana, on 6 August 2026 set aside a decree of divorce that had been granted by the XVI Additional Family Court, Ranga Reddy District at Malkajgiri, in a matrimonial dispute arising from a marriage solemnised on 5 February 2009. The Family Court had dissolved the marriage under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, on the ground of cruelty, but also explicitly rested its conclusion on the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage owing to long separation. The Division Bench found both bases legally unsustainable. The husband had examined only himself and produced no corroborating witnesses or documents for his principal cruelty allegations, while the Family Court had applied a ground—irretrievable breakdown—that does not exist in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Two Petitions, One Contested Marriage

The parties married on 5 February 2009 under Hindu rites. It was an arranged marriage. A daughter was born on 26 November 2009. The wife left the matrimonial home along with the child on 15 August 2010 and the couple has lived separately since that date.

The husband filed O.P. No. 270 of 2011 before the Family Court under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, seeking dissolution of the marriage on the ground of cruelty. The wife filed O.P. No. 1888 of 2013 under Section 9 of the same Act seeking restitution of conjugal rights. The Family Court dealt with both petitions together and on 31 January 2017 passed a common order: it dismissed the wife’s petition for restitution and allowed the husband’s petition, granting a decree of divorce.

Both parties appealed to the High Court — the wife in F.C.A. No. 229 of 2017 challenging the divorce decree, and in F.C.A. No. 202 of 2017 pressing her claim for restitution of conjugal rights. Since the pleadings in both petitions were substantially identical, the Division Bench proceeded on the pleadings in O.P. No. 270 of 2011.

The Husband’s Allegations Before the Family Court

The husband contended that after an initial period of harmony at Sirpur Kagaznagar, disputes erupted. He alleged that the wife repeatedly left for her parental home without informing him and refused to return unless he or his family personally fetched her. She allegedly insisted on living separately from his parents and wanted to relocate to Hyderabad. He claimed she turned physically violent toward him and his mother, and abused his father in filthy language when the latter intervened.

He further alleged that the wife suffered from psychological disorders and hysteria, a fact he claimed was suppressed before the marriage. He contended she threatened to implicate him and his family in false criminal cases. According to him, she lodged a complaint before Neredmet Police on false allegations; he and his father were arrested in that case and remanded to judicial custody for five days before being released on bail. His mother and sister obtained anticipatory bail. He also alleged the wife later filed a false dowry harassment case against him and his family members and separately sought maintenance.

The Wife’s Counter Before the Family Court

The wife denied all allegations. She contended that the description of her as a “psycho and hysteria patient” was defamatory. She stated that despite attending to all household work, she was not permitted to eat in the presence of her husband and in-laws, who would create a scene whenever she attempted to do so. She alleged the respondent treated her like a slave, barred her from speaking to her parents over the phone, and prevented her relatives from visiting.

She further alleged that her father paid Rs. 7,00,000 as dowry at the respondent’s demand, that the respondent and his family assaulted her and the child, locked the kitchen after meals, and pressured her to abort her pregnancy. She alleged that on 14 August 2010 the respondent and his parents assaulted her parents, and that they threatened a divorce petition unless her father paid an additional Rs. 2,00,000. She maintained that on 15 August 2010 the respondent and his family forcibly drove her and the child out of the matrimonial home.

To disprove the cruelty allegations, the wife examined herself as R.W.1 and her father as R.W.2. No documents were marked on her behalf. The husband examined only himself as P.W.1 and filed three exhibits: a copy of the wedding card, a copy of the FIR in Crime No. 375/2010 at Neredmet Police Station, and a final report in that case.

Why the Family Court’s Decree Could Not Stand

The Division Bench identified two distinct failures in the Family Court’s reasoning.

Unproved cruelty allegations. The husband had specifically alleged that the wife was a psycho and hysteria patient whose condition was suppressed before the marriage. He produced no document and examined no witness to substantiate this. The Division Bench pointed out that the fathers of both parties were colleagues who worked in the same paper mills and lived in the same colony — a fact admitted by R.W.2 in cross-examination. This proximity made the suppression allegation implausible, yet the Family Court did not address it. The burden of proving the allegation lay on the husband; he did not discharge it.

More broadly, the husband had made several other cruelty allegations but examined no witness other than himself — not his parents, not panchayat elders, no one. The Division Bench applied settled principles on the definition of cruelty drawn from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511, Rakesh Raman v. Smt. Kavita, AIR 2023 SC 2144, and Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, (2006) 4 SCC 558. Cruelty, the Bench reiterated, is a course of conduct adversely affecting the other party. It may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional, and each case turns on its own facts. What matters is cogent evidence — which the husband had not produced.

On the criminal complaint specifically, the Bench noted that the case registered under Section 498-A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act ended in acquittal. It held plainly that mere lodging of a complaint under Section 498-A does not amount to cruelty and cannot by itself be a ground for dissolution of marriage.

Irretrievable breakdown applied without statutory basis. In its common order, the Family Court had recorded that the parties had been living separately since 15 August 2010, that the marriage had irretrievably broken down, and that long separation itself leads to mental cruelty. On this basis it granted the divorce decree. The Division Bench held that this reasoning was legally impermissible. Neither the Family Court nor the High Court has the power to dissolve a marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage; that ground does not exist in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Family Court had given a specific finding that the marriage had irretrievably broken down and granted the decree on that foundation. The Division Bench characterised the impugned order as not addressing the material aspects of evidence and as not being a reasoned order. It set the order aside accordingly.

The Daughter and Maintenance

The Division Bench noted that the daughter, born on 26 November 2009, is 16 years old. During the hearing, the wife’s counsel, Sri Seshadri Goalla, stated on instructions that the wife and daughter were willing to stay with the respondent.

In cross-examination before the Family Court, the husband (P.W.1) had categorically admitted that he wished to have his daughter with him but had neither filed any petition for interim custody nor for visitation rights. He also admitted he was not interested in leading a marital life with the wife. The Division Bench noted that the Family Court had not considered these admissions in its common order.

Separately, the wife had filed a petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the husband seeking maintenance. The Magistrate allowed that application and awarded Rs. 5,000 per month to the wife and Rs. 4,000 per month to the minor daughter. The husband was paying those amounts, and there was no allegation of default.

Outcome

F.C.A. No. 229 of 2017, filed by the wife challenging the divorce decree, was allowed. The decree of divorce granted in O.P. No. 270 of 2011 was set aside.

F.C.A. No. 202 of 2017, filed by the wife seeking restitution of conjugal rights, was disposed of. The Division Bench declined to allow that petition directly, observing that it had been filed in 2013 and that the parties had been living separately since 15 August 2010. Liberty was granted to the wife to file a fresh application seeking restitution of conjugal rights. She was also left free to seek enhancement of the maintenance amount.

Miscellaneous applications, if any, were dismissed. No order as to costs was made.