Kerala HC frees anti-social law detainee: State listed his representation, never weighed it
A Division Bench held that a confirmation order which named a representation from the detenue without addressing its contents breached Article 22(5), and that a seven-week gap before the detention proposal broke the link to his last alleged offence.
The Kerala Government's confirmation order listed a detainee's representation as item six and then never engaged with a word of it. On 13 November the Kerala High Court held that this alone voided his preventive detention under the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007, and ordered his release.
A Division Bench of Justice Anil K. Narendran and Justice Muralee Krishna S. decided the habeas corpus petition filed by the detainee's wife. The judgment was written by Justice Muralee Krishna. It also found a second fatal flaw: seven weeks passed between the last alleged offence and the police proposal for detention.
A five-case rowdy and a detention order
The detenue, Sadiq, 32, from Ponnani in Malappuram, was classed as a "known rowdy" on the strength of five criminal cases. The District Collector and District Magistrate of Malappuram ordered his detention on 1 July 2026 under Section 3(1) of the Act. It was executed on 4 July.
The last prejudicial act relied on was Crime No. 311 of 2026 of Ponnani Police Station, registered under Sections 118(1), 110, 324(1) and 324(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The incident was on 22 March 2026. He was arrested on 2 May and given bail on 4 May.
The District Police Chief sent the sponsoring report on 11 May. The Government approved the detention under Section 3(3) on 15 July, and on 5 September confirmed it under Section 10(4) for six months from the date of detention.
His wife, Shamila Sadiq, 26, came to the High Court under Article 226. She sought to quash all three orders and a writ of habeas corpus for his release.
Eight grounds from the petitioner
Advocate M. H. Hanis, for the petitioner, pressed eight grounds. Two were about service of documents under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) and the approval timeline under Section 3(3).
Others said an additional report of 11 June 2026 was never supplied, and that the representations of the wife (9 July) and the detenue (10 July) were not properly considered. Counsel also pointed to unexplained delay in making the proposal, and to a failure to consider why an earlier detention order against him had been set aside.
The last two were that the confirmation order was not a speaking order, and that the State ignored a pending application to cancel his bail in the penultimate case.
The State: every step was followed
Senior Government Pleader Reeha Khader K. answered point by point. She produced copies of the supplied documents bearing the detenue's acknowledgement, and said the additional report had been furnished too.
The wife's representation was decided on 18 July 2026, she said, and the order was posted the same day. The detenue's own representation, she argued, was dealt with in the confirmation order. The delay was explained in paragraph 12 of the detention order, and bail cancellation need not be exhausted first because the two remedies serve different ends.
Six objections that failed
The Bench checked the acknowledged copies. The detenue had signed every page in his own hand, all pages were legible, and the additional report of 11 June was among them. The Section 7 argument and the additional-report argument both failed.
The approval order of 15 July came within 12 days of the detention order once public holidays were excluded, as Section 3(3) allows. Nothing showed that the documents referred to in the order were withheld from the Government. That argument failed too.
The wife's representation had been considered on 18 July and the result posted that day. On the reasons for six months, the Bench said the confirmation order had weighed all relevant material, including the detention order, so it was not unreasoned on that count.
Bail cancellation is not a precondition
The court first set out the competing authorities. In Jancy Joseph, a Division Bench quashed a detention where only the first of three cases involved a non-bailable offence and the authority had not even considered cancelling that bail.
In Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala, the Supreme Court set aside a detention built on money-lending offences. It said the circumstances might justify asking a court to cancel bail, but not preventive detention.
A Division Bench in Sujodh K. read Dhanya narrowly, as a ruling on its own facts. It held that where a known goonda or known rowdy faces imminent risk of repeating offences, authorities need not wait for a bail cancellation order.
The Chief Justice's Bench in W.P.(Crl.) No. 590 of 2026 had struck down a detention because the authority practically abandoned a pending cancellation application and never explained why. Another Bench, in Sulaiman M.V., declined to quash on the same ground because the authorities had recorded why bail conditions had failed as a deterrent.
The Sujodh Bench also pointed out that Dhanya turned on offences that did not touch public order, and on a finding that the authority gave no reason why the detenue's acts threatened it.
From these, the court drew one rule. Whether bail cancellation must be tried first depends on the facts of each case, and it cannot be accepted as a general proposition.
Where a known rowdy or drug peddler is likely to repeat offences, cancellation may not deter him, and the process is slow. It also needs cogent and overwhelming circumstances, such as witness intimidation or tampering.
Preventive detention asks something else: whether the authority has independently met the statutory conditions and the constitutional safeguards. The bail-cancellation ground failed.
The representation that was listed but not weighed
The Bench accepted that the wife's representation was decided on 18 July. But it recorded that the detenue's own representation of 10 July was, admittedly, not independently considered by the Government, either before or after it approved the detention.
The confirmation order did refer to it, as item 6 among the materials. The contentions inside it were not addressed anywhere. The court's reading of the Government's duty was direct:
“Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India is violated, rendering the detention void” (para 13)
The Government must consider such a representation by a separate order, or at least by referring to its contentions while confirming the detention, the Bench held. Merely listing it does neither.
Two earlier benches on the same lapse
The court leaned on Fathimath Thasneem V. K. v. Union of India, decided this year by the same High Court. A wife had challenged her husband's detention under the narcotics preventive detention law, and his representation was considered nearly seven weeks after it was made.
No explanation came for that delay, and the earlier Bench held that it denied a constitutional safeguard and made the detention void. It stressed that a representation must be considered independently and as expeditiously as possible.
The Bench also quoted a Division Bench headed by the Chief Justice in W.P.(Crl.) No. 715 of 2026, decided on 11 August 2026 under the same Kerala Act. There the confirming authority relied on an Advisory Board report that had not considered the representation at all.
That Bench held the Government had to weigh the representation itself, with real reasons. The word "afresh" would not do. Reasons, it said, introduce clarity and minimise arbitrariness, and an order that does not disclose why a representation was rejected is vitiated for want of reasons.
The Fathimath Thasneem Bench had also worked through the Supreme Court's rulings in K. M. Abdulla Kunhi, Ankit Ashok Jalan and Pramod Singla on whether the Government must wait for the Advisory Board. It distinguished them because the representation in that case went to the Central Government.
The present Bench found the confirmation order of 5 September wanting on the plain rule that survived all of this. The Government must apply its own mind to what the detenue says, and must be seen to have done so.
Seven weeks before the proposal moved
The second ground concerned time. The last prejudicial activity was on 22 March 2026, yet the sponsoring report went up only on 11 May.
The Bench asked what had stopped the authorities, if they genuinely feared a repeat, from moving under Section 3(1) straight after the March incident. Nothing in the detention order says.
The Bench recalled that the same detenue's previous order had been quashed on 14 August 2025 in W.P.(Crl.) No. 975 of 2025, for delay in submitting the proposal. It found the identical mistake repeated, and put it this way:
“snaps the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the detention order” (para 14)
Order
The writ petition was allowed and Exts. P1 to P3, the detention order of 1 July 2026, the Government approval of 15 July and the confirmation of 5 September, were set aside. The court gave two reasons: no independent consideration of the detenue's representation, and unexplained, inordinate delay in the proposal.
The Superintendent of the High Security Prison, Viyyur, was directed to release Sadiq forthwith unless his detention is required in connection with any other case. The Registry was told to send the order to the Superintendent by email at once.